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Workmen's Compensation 
by Jack E. Goshkin* 
The most significant trend and development in workmen's 
compensation law in the past year has been the activity of 
the appellate courts in annulling and reversing the decisions 
of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.! With the 
Labor Code's severe limitations on the scope of judicial review 
of WCAB decisions,2 particularly on the right of the courts 
to review factual determinations, and with most of the WCAB 
cases containing factual rather than legal questions, the ma-
jority of petitions for writ of review have been and still are 
being denied.3 
* J.D. 1961, Golden Gate College, 
School of Law. Partner: Goshkin and 
Pollatsek. Member, California State 
Bar. 
The author extends his appreciation 
to Bernard Garber, student at Golden 
Gate College, School of Law, for assist-
ance in preparation of this article. 
1. Hereinafter referred to as WCAB. 
2. See Cal. Lab. Code §§ 5952, 5953, 
and discussion infra. 
3. WACB Chairman Morton Colvin 
has stated that of the 143 cases which 
were appealed from action of the 
WCAB between January and September 
1, of 1968, the appeals board action 
was sustained in 121 cases. While Mr. 
Colvin did not state the number of 
CAL LAW 1969 99 
1
Goshkin: Workmen's Compensation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
Workmen's Compensation 
The character of the questions presented to the WCAB 
has not changed; the questions remain primarily factual. 
However, the frequency with which the courts annulled WCAB 
decisions has increased noticeably in the past year. 4 A review 
of the cases points up the changed attitude of the courts in 
interpretation of Labor Code section 5952 and its "substan-
tial evidence rule." Future effect of the appellate courts' 
actions, in retreating from the long-standing interpretation of 
section 5952, is of vital concern to any attorney practicing 
in the field of workmen's compensation. 
Another major trend of the past year has been the dramatic 
reduction in the amount of litigation of workmen's compen-
sation claims. In attempting a prediction of whether the 
reduction in the number of claims will continue through future 
years, California lawyers may consider the two new programs 
introduced by the WCAB, which are discussed below. 
Other developments in specific areas of workmen's com-
pensation law are set forth in the latter portion of the article. 
The Change of Judicial Attitude in Appellate Review of 
WCAB Decisions 
A reading of the WCAB cases in which judicial review was 
granted between October 1, 1967 and October 15, 1968 re-
veals that the appellate courts are more and more reviewing 
factual determinations of the WCAB. While the factual re-
cases in which appeals board action was 
sustained by denial of review, reading 
the cases in the advance sheets would 
lead one to believe that in only 2 or 3 
cases at most was the board action 
sustained in cases where review was 
granted. 
4. A count of the WCAB cases re-
ported in California Compensation 
Cases for the years 1965, 1966, 1967 
and through October 1968 reveals that 
in 1965, the action of the WCAB was 
reviewed in a total of 28 cases and 
affirmed in 12 of those cases; in 1966, 
the WCAB action was affirmed in 12 of 
28 cases and in 1967, the WCAB was 
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affirmed in 12 of 29 cases. Through 
October of 1968, the WCAB was 
reversed or annulled in 42 of 52 
cases granted review. In an address 
given before workmen's compensation 
referees and attorneys in San Diego on 
October 8, 1968, Supreme Court Justice 
Stanley Mosk said: ". . . A mere 
cursory reading of the advance sheets 
of both the Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court reveals that a greater 
number of Workmen's Compensation 
Appeals Board awards have been an-
nulled in the years 1967 and 1968 than 
in any similar period in the state's 
recorded judicial history." 
2
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view was sometimes managed in a rather oblique manner, 
the increased interest of the courts in the factual determinations 
of the WCAB is bound to have an impact on California 
Workmen's Compensation Law. In fact, there may well 
have been a tacit change in the "substantial evidence rule" 
as it applies to the determinations of the WCAB. 
Before reviewing some of the cases in which the courts 
have disagreed with the factual determinations of the WCAB 
and accordingly annulled or reversed its decisions, a brief 
outline of the statutory restrictions on appellate review and 
court interpretations of those statutes5 will point up the 
changed attitude of the courts. 
Labor Code section 59526 sets forth the general scope of 
judicial review of WCAB decisions. It restates the "sub-
stantial evidence rule" as applied generally to administrative 
bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions and provides in part 
that nothing in the section shall permit the court to exercise 
its independent judgment on the evidence. Section 59537 
provides in part that the findings and conclusions of the 
appeals board on questions of fact are conclusive and final and 
not subject to review. 
In interpreting those statutes, the courts have held that an 
5. All sections referred to are from 
the Labor Code, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
6. Cal. Lab. Code § 5952. The re-
view by the court shall not be extended 
further than to determine, based upon 
the entire record which shall be cer-
tified by the appeals board, whether: 
(a) The appeals board acted without 
or in excess of its powers. 
(b) The order, decision, or award 
was procured by fraud. 
(c) The order, decision, or award 
was unreasonable. 
(d) The order, decision, or award 
was not supported by substantial evi-
dence. 
(e) If findings of fact are made, such 
findings of fact support the order, de-
cision, or award under review. 
Nothing in this section shall permit 
the court to hold a trial de novo, to 
take evidence, or to exercise its inde-
pendent judgment on the evidence. 
7. Cal. Lab. Code § 5953. The 
findings and conclusions of the appeals 
board on questions of fact are conclu-
sive and final and are not subject to 
review. Such questions of fact shall 
include ultimate facts and the findings 
and conclusions of the appeals board. 
The appeals board and each party to 
the action or proceeding before the 
appeals board shall have the right to 
appear in the review proceeding. Up-
on the hearing, the court shall enter 
judgment either affirming or annulling 
the order, decision, or award, or the 
court may remand the case for further 
proceedings before the appeals board. 
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award of the WCAB8 would not be disturbed unless there was 
an entire lack of evidence to support it and that the court 
could not be concerned with conflicts in the evidence.9 If 
the findings of the WCAB were supported by inferences which 
could be fairly drawn from evidence, even though the evidence 
was susceptible of opposing inferences, the reviewing court 
would not disturb the award. IO If a decision of the WCAB 
could be supported on any ground, it became immaterial that 
other grounds were improper. ll In reviewing an award ren-
dered by the WCAB, the court was required to indulge in all 
reasonable inferences to support the board's finding.12 Find-
ings of the WCAB were to be interpreted liberally in favor 
of sustaining an award, even where reference to the record 
was required. 13 The WCAB, and not the court, was author-
ized to draw inferences from the evidence and base conclusions 
thereon.14 The WCAB's findings of fact were not subject 
to review where it could not be said that no reasonable man 
could reach the conclusion that the board reached.15 
The number of cases in which the courts declined to review 
or overturn the findings of the WCAB is legion. Succinctly 
stated, the "substantial evidence rule" has been applied to 
WCAB decisions. The courts have refused to weigh or to 
re-evaluate the evidence; they merely isolate that evidence 
which could support the decision, and if there was any such 
evidence, the WCAB's action was affirmed. 
One may wonder how an appellate court could possibly 
bridge the vast sea of precedent limiting and restricting its 
8. The judicial functions of the old 
Industrial Accident Commission were 
transferred to the WCAB January 15, 
1966. 
9. Associated Indem. Corp. v. In-
dustrial Accident Comm., 18 Cal.2d 
40, 112 P.2d 615 (1941). 
10. Riskin v. Industrial Accident 
Comm., 23 Cal.2d 248, 144 P.2d 16 
(1943). 
11. Sweeney v. Industrial Accident 
Comm., 107 Cal. App.2d 155, 236 
P.2d 651 (1951). 
102 CAL LAW 1969 
12. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial 
Accident Comm., 28 Cal.2d 329, 170 
P .2d 18 (1946). 
13. Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial 
Accident Comm., 40 Cal.2d 102, 251 
P.2d 955 (1953). 
14. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co. v. 
Industrial Accident Comm., 2 Cal.2d 
685, 43 P.2d 282 (1935). 
15. Carmichael v. Industrial Accident 
Comm., 234 Cal. App.2d 311, 44 Cal. 
Rptr. 470 (1965). 
4
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right to disagree with the WCAB's view of the evidence. But 
in 1967, the courts apparently discovered section 5908.5 of 
the Labor CodeI6 which had been added in 1951 and amended 
to its present form in 1955. That section proved to be the 
span needed. It requires the WCAB to state the evidence 
upon which it relies and to specify in detail the reasons for 
its decision when it affirms, rescinds, alters, or amends an 
original finding of a referee.17 
The first application of section 5908.5 appeared in the 
case of Wilhelm v. WCAB/ 8 decided October 5, 1967. The 
applicant for workmen's compensation benefits was a school 
nurse who alleged disability by reason of contracting herpes 
zoster from exposure to chickenpox in the course of her em-
ployment. The referee found industrial injury and defendant 
petitioned for reconsideration. The WCAB granted recon-
sideration, vacated the referee's findings and award, and issued 
an order denying benefits. In her petition for a writ of review, 
the applicant contended that, in finding that she did not sus-
tain industrial injury, the board disregarded the substantial 
evidence to the contrary. In its answer to applicant's petition 
for a writ, the WCAB contended that there was "some evi-
16. Cal. Lab. Code § 5908.5. Any 
decision of the appeals board granting 
or denying a petition for reconsidera-
tion or affirming, rescinding, altering, 
or amending the original findings, order, 
decision, or award following recon-
sideration shall be made by the appeals 
board and not by a referee and shall 
be in writing, signed by a majority of 
the appeals board members assigned 
thereto, and shall state the evidence re-
lied upon and specify in detail the 
reasons for the decision. 
17. Workmen's Compensation cases 
are initially heard by a trial referee 
who decides all issues of fact and law 
presented. Any person aggrieved by 
the referee's final decision may petition 
the seven-man appeals board for re-
consideration. Such petItIOns are 
usually considered and decided by ro-
tating panels of three board members. 
If the questions presented are deemed 
of sufficieni importance, all seven mem-
bers of the board will consider and 
decide a petition for reconsideration 
en banco The board may grant or 
deny reconsideration. If reconsidera-
tion is granted, the board may, with or 
without proceedings, affirm, rescind, 
alter or amend the referee's order, 
award, or decision (§§ 5900-5911). 
Any person "affected" by the board's 
order, decision or award (including an 
order denying reconsideration) may 
apply to the supreme court or the court 
of appeal for a writ of review for the 
purpose of inquiring into and deter-
mining the lawfulness of the board's 
action (§§ 5950-5956). 
18. 255 Cal. App.2d 30, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. 829 (1967). 
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dence" to support its finding. The court of appeal specifically 
stated that it was not considering the question of sufficiency 
of evidence, and that it was applying instead the provisions 
of section 5908.5. The court stated: 
In its decision after reconsideration the appeals board, 
pursuant to Labor Code, section 5908.5, did not com-
ment on the evidence but stated as the reason for its 
decision that it found merit in the contention of respond-
ents [defendants below] "that there is no evidence of 
exposure of the applicant to an infectious or contagious 
disease." Our review of the record shows that there is 
substantial evidence on this issue and no reason appears 
to justify its exclusion from consideration.19 
The court went on to recite the evidence in the record that 
would support a finding of applicant's exposure to chicken-
pox and stated that there was no evidence that she was not 
so exposed. One wonders why, if there was no evidence in 
the record to support the WCAB's decision, the court of appeal 
did not annul on that basis. If there was any evidence at all 
in the record that, even though the applicant may have been 
exposed to chickenpox during the course of her employment, 
her own disease was not the result of such exposure, the 
court, if it intended to comply with the historic limitations on 
its right to review factual matters, had a duty to draw such 
inference in support of the WCAB's denial of benefits. 
Another application of section 5908.5 appeared in Evans 
v. WCAB,20 decided by the California Supreme Court in 
June of 1968. The referee had found the applicant not 
barred from reopeping an old case by reason of incompetency. 
The board, after granting defendant reconsideration, annulled 
the referee's finding, ruling instead that the applicant's injury 
did not cause further disability and that his claim was barred 
by the limitations period. The court of appeal denied a writ 
of review and the supreme court then granted review. In its 
rather short decision, the court stated: 
19. 255 Cal. App.2d at 32, 62 Cal. 20. 68 Cal.2d 753, 68 Cal Rptr. 825, 
Rptr. at 830. 441 P.2d 633 (1968). 
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The only reference by the board to the evidence and to 
the reasons for its decision was the statement that "We 
have carefully reviewed the record in this matter and are 
of the opinion that it is not established by the evidence 
therein that applicant was incompetent as he alleges. 
His petition to reopen which was filed on June 3, 1966 
was therefore barred. "1 
The court referred to section 5908.5, quoted a Public Utili-
ties Commission decision2 stating the purpose of the require-
ment that evidence be stated and reasons detailed, and found 
that the WCAB had not regularly pursued its authority. The 
court therefore annulled the decision. 
In White v. WCAB,3 a widow received an award for death 
benefits including a penalty for serious and wilful misconduct. 
The WCAB granted defendant reconsideration, vacated the 
referee's award, and found that the death was not caused by 
serious and wilful misconduct of the employer. The court 
of appeal granted review and, in a long decision, discussed 
the evidence and safety orders applicable. The court said 
that the WCAB had misinterpreted some of the applicable 
safety regulations and further stated: 
Apart from the board's evident misinterpretation of the 
safety regulations, its opinion is significantly devoid of 
any statement of the evidence relied upon and of any 
statement of the reasons for its ultimate decision. The 
decision thus fails to comply with section 5908.5 of the 
Labor Code.4 
1. 68 Cal.2d at 754, 68 Cal. Rptr. 
at 826, 441 P.2d at 634. 
2. "The purpose of the requirement 
that evidence be stated and reasons 
detailed appears analogous to that of 
the requirement of section 1705 of the 
Public Utilities Code that decisions of 
the Public Utilities Commission con-
tain separately stated findings of the 
basic facts upon all material issues. 
It is to assist the reviewing court to 
ascertain the principles relied upon by 
the lower tribunal, to help that tribunal 
avoid careless or arbitrary action, and 
to make the right of appeal or of seek-
ing review more meaningful." Grey-
hound Lines, Inc. v. Public Util. 
Comm., 65 Cal.2d 811, 56 Cal. Rptr. 
484, 423 P.2d 556 (1967). 
3. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
49 (1968). 
4. 265 Cal. App.2d at -, 71 Cal. 
Rptr. at 55. 
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The court annulled the WCAB decision and remanded it 
for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed 
in its opinion. 
Why did the court feel it necessary to raise the question 
of section 5908.5? It stated: "As we read the record the 
evidence clearly sustains the findings of the referee that this 
element of serious and willful misconduct of the employer 
had been established." (The court did not address itself to 
the question of whether there was any evidence in the record 
to sustain the WCAB's decision.) The court could simply 
have found that by a misinterpretation of a safety order, the 
WCAB had made an error of law; it did not need to refer 
to section 5908.5 or to the evidence. 
In the case of Brennfieck v. WCAB,5 the court of appeal 
annulled a decision after reconsiderations vacating a referee's 
award of death benefits to an alleged widow. The stated 
reason for the annulment was the WCAB's failure to state 
the evidence relied upon and to detail the reasons for its 
action as required by section 5908.5. The primary question 
in Brennfieck was whether the petitioner could qualify for 
death benefits as a widow or putative spouse of an employee 
killed in the course of his employment. The court outlined 
the evidence that would support a finding that the petitioner 
was a putative spouse and stated that "There is uncontradicted 
proof-all of it substantial-to indicate that petitioner in 
good faith believed she was legally married to Carl and that 
Carl joined in that belief."6 Again, the court did not discuss 
the question of whether there was any evidence in the record, 
or any evidence from which inferences could be made, to 
support the WCAB's decision. Why, if there were no sub-
stantial eviden~e in the record to support the WCAB's deci-
sion, did the court have to rely on section 5908.5? 
The case of Holcomb v. WCAB7 is unusual in the class of 
5. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 7. 266 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
525 (1968). 874 (1968). 
6. 265 Cal. App.2d at -, 71 Cal. 
Rptr. at 530. 
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cases now under discussion. This is not a case in which the 
WCAB overturned an original decision of a referee. Rather, 
it is one in which a referee granted an award for permanent 
disability but denied further medical treatment. . After appli-
cant's petition for reconsideration was denied, she petitioned 
for review. The review was granted and the court annulled 
the order denying reconsideration on the ground that it did 
not comply with section 5908.5. The court, after pointing out 
that the WCAB had stated it had carefully reviewed the record 
and had quoted from one medical report, nevertheless found 
that such a statement was not in compliance with the require-
ments of section 5908.5. The court noted that the extensive 
quotations from the record in the board's answer to the petition 
for review did not meet the requirements of section 5908.5 
because of that section's provision that the WCAB shall state 
in its decision the evidence on which it relied. 
If the WCAB could quote extensively from the record in 
support of its decision in its brief, there must have been some 
favorable evidence which the court could have used to uphold 
the decision had it wished to abide by its traditional refusal 
to reweigh and re-evaluate the evidence. 
In the case of Granado v. WeAB s the supreme court an-
nulled a decision of the WCAB apportioning temporary dis-
ability and medical treatment between an industrial injury 
and a pre-existing non-industrial condition. The WCAB's 
decision had been upheld by the district court of appeal,9 
but the supreme court noted that the question before it had not 
been squarely decided and then discussed the statutes and the 
cases applicable. After deciding that apportionment was not 
in order as a matter of law, the court stated that the decision 
had to be annulled for another reason-the WCAB had not 
complied with section 5908.5 in setting forth its reasons for 
allowing apportionment. It would seem from this decision 
that, as a matter of law, the WCAB could not apportion 
medical treatment and temporary disability between an indus-
8. 69 Cal.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 678, 9. 258 A.C.A. 131, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
445 P.2d 294 (1968). 523 (1968). 
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trial injury and a non-industrial condition would be a suffi-
cient basis on which to annul the WCAB's decision. 10 
Lundberg v. WCAB lJ is perhaps the most interesting of the 
cases in which the courts have relied at least in part on 
section 5908.5 to support annulment of WCAB decisions. 
More openly than the other cases, it reveals the supreme 
court's discontent with the WCAB's factual determinations. 
In Lundberg one of the two reporting doctors gave no opinion 
as to the cause of injury. The other doctor stated: 
I do not know what caused the 4th lumbar intervertebral 
disc to rupture. It is possible that his work activity 
between 5-8-67 and the onset of symptoms on 6-27-67 
was responsible for this rupture but it is equally possible 
that the rupture would have occurred had he not been 
working at all.12 
The referee found that the petitioner suffered injury to his 
lower back arising out of and in the course of his employment. 
The defendant's petition for reconsideration was granted and 
the WCAB discussed the reports of the doctors and concluded 
that the applicant had not met his burden of proof to establish 
that his injury was industrially caused. In annulling the deci-
sion of the WCAB, the court devoted most of its opinion to 
a discussion of the applicant's burden of proof and to the 
Labor Code's direction that provisions of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act are to be liberally construed.13 
The court engaged in a neat bit of semantic sleight of hand 
by severing that portion of the medical opinion quoted above 
which states that "it would be equally possible that the rupture 
would have occurred had he [the appplicant] not been working 
at all," and by characterizing that portion as "at most neutral." 
The court then found the first part of the sentence which 
states "it is possible that his work activities. caused 
the rupture," along with applicant's testimony that he had 
10. 69 Cal.2d at -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 12. 69 Cal.2d at -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
at 683, 445 P.2d at 299-300. at 685, 445 P.2d at 301. 
11. 69 Cal.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 684, 13. Cal. Lab. Code § 3202. 
445 P.2d 300 (1968). 
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his onset of pains at work, to constitute undisputed evidence 
that "points toward" an industrial injury. The court went 
on to say that the WCAB had means by which it could have 
resolved its doubts as to causation (by taking additional evi-
dence, having the applicant examined by a physician) but that 
the board had not followed these procedures and had, instead, 
determined ". . . in the absence of any supporting evidence 
to reject the inference of industrial causation, and this it may 
not do.,,14 (Emphasis added.) The court then brought up 
section 5908.5 and expressed grave doubt of the board's 
compliance with that requirement: 
The board has failed to point in its decision to any valid 
basis for rejecting the inference of industrial causation 
arising from the undisputed facts and Dr. Haldeman's 
report. ., The board has failed to set forth the 
undisputed evidence that the symptoms occurred when 
petitioner was engaged in the kind of work which could 
cause the injury, and has failed to furnish any reason 
to ignore it. 15 
Obviously a reasonable man could as easily infer from the 
medical report that the injury was not industrially caused 
as he could infer, as the court did, that it was industrially 
caused. Therefore, the court would be hard put to annul 
the decision in Lundberg on the ground that there was no 
evidence whatsoever in the record to sustain the decision 
of the WCAB. It is apparent that the court was in fact exer-
cising its independent judgment on the evidence16 and was 
most certainly reviewing the findings and conclusions of the 
WCAB on questions of fact both of which activities are pro-
hibited by statute.17 
In all the above cases, the courts have relied, at least in 
part, on section 5908.5 to annul WCAB denials of workmen's 
compensation benefits where they thought there was substan-
tial evidence in the record to support a decision granting those 
14. 69 Ca1.2d at -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
at 686, 445 P.2d at 302. 
15. 69 Cal.2d at -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
at 687, 445 P.2d at 303. 
16. See Cal. Lab. Code * 5952. 
17. See Cal. Lab. Code § 5953. 
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benefits. If the records in the cases above had been entirely 
devoid of any evidence in support of the WCAB's decisions 
denying benefits, the courts could, and probably would, forth-
rightly annul the awards on the ground that there was no 
substantial evidence to support the WCAB. In the past year, 
the courts have not been bashful about annulling WCAB 
awards on grounds other than section 5908.5 and have in 
several cases annulled the awards on the ground that there 
was no substantial evidence to support the WCAB's decision. 
In Clem mens v. WCAB 18 the referee found that death did 
not arise out of and occur in the course of employment; the 
petition for reconsideration was denied. The court of appeal 
annulled the ruling on the ground that the referee's opinion 
stated that the cause of death had not been determined and 
that it was required of the board to resolve the conflicting 
evidence on the cause of death. The decision, devoted largely 
to a discussion of the reasons for holding deaths from unknown 
causes occurring in the course of employment as compensable, 
admonished the WCAB that it was bound by the fundamental 
principle that all reasonable doubts as to whether an injury 
is compensable are to be resolved in favor of the employee. 
However, the court overlooked the statutory prohibition on 
its power to review the evidence. 
In Jones v. WCAB/9 the supreme court annulled an order 
of the WCAB overturning a referee's award of compensation 
benefits, addressing itself to the question of whether the 
claimant had suffered new and further disability resulting 
from a 1961 injury for which he had already been awarded 
a 42 percent permanent disability on November 10, 1965. 
In reversing the referee, the WCAB relied upon medical 
reports that had been filed during earlier proceedings. The 
court held that it was error for the WCAB to do so. While 
the court does not clearly so state, it appears that it annulled 
on the ground that there was no substantial evidence to sup-
port the WCAB's decision and the evidence upon which the 
WCAB relied was no longer germane to the question. Sim-
18. 261 Cal. App.2d I, 68 Cal. Rptr. 19. 68 Cal.2d 476. 67 Cal. Rptr. 
804 (1968). 544. 439 P .2d 648 (1968). 
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ilarly, in Berry v. WCAB,20 Zemke v. WCAB/ and Zurich 
Insurance v. WCAB,2 the courts annulled WCAB decisions 
on the ground that there was no substantial evidence to sup-
port those decisions. 
The court's overturning of so many WCAB decisions in so 
short a period on the ground that the decisions were not 
supported by substantial evidence might, in itself, be indic-
ative of a trend. However, the most significant development 
has been the courts' use of section 5908.5 to annul decisions 
in which they believed, after reweighing and reinterpreting 
the evidence, that the evidence supporting an award for ben-
efits had not been given sufficient weight by the WCAB. 
Section 5908.5 has been in effect in its present form since 
1955, but research has failed to discover a single case prior 
to October, 1967 in which the courts have annulled decisions 
on the ground that the WCAB had not complied with the 
provisions of that section-in spite of prior presentations of 
that argument to the courts. Prior to 1967, cases presenting 
the 5908.5 argument to the courts had been denied review.3 
The present trend appears to be that the court will review 
the evidence and annul the award where it believes that there is 
no substantial evidence to support the WCAB award. Where 
there is some evidence to support the WCAB's denial of bene-
fits but, in the court's view, a preponderance of evidence to 
support granting benefits, the trend is to annul the award 
on the ground that the WCAB had not complied with section 
5908.5. No doubt this tactic has caught the WCAB by sur-
20. 68 Cal.2d 786, 69 Cal. Rptr. 
68, 441 P.2d 908 (1968). 
1. 68 Cal.2d 794, 69 Cal. Rptr. 88, 
441 P.2d 928 (1968). 
2. 33 C.c.c. 569 (1968) (opinion not 
published in official reports). 
3. Arabian American Oil Co. v. In-
dustrial Accident Comm., 17 C.C.c. 
54 (1952); Romeo v. Industrial Acci-
dent Comm., 21 c.c.c. 280 (1956); 
Andreini v. Industrial Accident Comm., 
23 c.c.c. 68 (1958); Schader v Indus-
trial Accident Comm., 28 C.C.c. 240 
(1963); Wray v. Industrial Accident 
Comm., 29 C.C.C. 248 (1964); Daly v. 
Industrial Accident Comm., 30 C.C.C. 
214 (1965); Chew Investments v. In-
dustrial Accident Comm., 30 C.c.c. 299 
(1965); Spreckels Sugar Co. v. Industrial 
Accident Comm., 30 C.C.C. 294 
(1965); Maryland Casualty Co. v. In-
dustrial Accident Comm., 30 C.C.C. 
389 (1965). 
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Workmen's Compensation 
prise. Section 5908.5, in effect in its present form for some 
12 years, had never before been used by the courts. 
Although it has been generally understood that the WCAB 
need not make negative findings but only specify by its 
findings the evidence upon which it rested its decision, setting 
forth findings limited to affirmative ultimate facts/ it now 
appears that, where the WCAB denies benefits, the courts 
want the board to set forth the evidence it has rejected and 
to explain its rejection. 
From the many admonitions in the decisions that the work-
men's compensation law must be liberally construed in favor 
of granting benefits, it is doubtful that the courts will indulge 
in the use of section 5908.5 to overturn any decision that 
grants benefits. Further, it is doubtful that the courts will 
overturn any decision granting benefits where there is any 
evidence whatsoever in the record, either directly or by infer-
ence, to support an award granting compensation benefits. 
It does appear, however, that the courts, and particularly the 
supreme court, will no longer confine their search of the 
record to an attempt to determine whether there is any evi-
dence or inference that could support the WCAB decision in 
those cases where the WCAB has denied compensation bene-
fits, but will re-evaluate and reinterpret the evidence to deter-
mine whether the WCAB has resolved all doubts and engaged 
in all possible inferences in favor of granting benefits. 
Reduction of Litigation 
For the first time in some thirteen years, the number of orig-
inal applications for hearing filed with the WCAB has de-
creased. Over the past ten years, the average annual increase 
in original filings has been 8.7 percent. For the first six 
months of 1968, there was a 4 percent decrease in original 
filings when compared to the corresponding period for the 
preceding year. 5 The reasons for the rather dramatic decrease 
4. Alexander v. WCAB, 262 Cal.2d man, WCAB, September 16, 1968, to 
-, 69 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1968). the International Association of Indus-
5. Statistics taken from a speech trial Accident Boards and Commissions. 
delivered by Morton R. Colvin, Chair-
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in the filing of original applications are not definitely ascer-
tainable but may be due to recent programs developed by 
the WCAB to reduce litigation. 
Under authority granted by Labor Code section 138.4, 
effective January 15, 1966, the Division of Industrial Acci-
dents enacted regulations requiring that employees receive 
notice of payment and non-payment of benefits, termination 
of benefits, and an accounting of benefits paid, and that insur-
ance companies provide copies of such notices to the division. 
In compiling reports, copies of notices of payment as received 
by the division are fed into computers; every six months a 
report is prepared covering the previous twelve-month period. 
These published reports set forth a statistically developed 
listing of insurance companies and self-insureds in a descend-
ing order of promptness of first payments to injured employ-
ees. Those companies who find themselves at the bottom of 
the list generally strive to improve their position before the 
next list is published. 
The effectiveness of this program in improving the prompt-
ness with which first payments are issued is shown by a 
contrast of studies made in 1963 and in 1968. The 1963 
study indicated that benefit payments were made by the 
fourteenth day after injury in only 19 percent of all cases. 
In 1968, some two years after the reporting procedure was 
instituted, first payments were made by the fourteenth day 
after beginning of disability in over 68 percent of the cases.6 
Another possible reason for reduction of litigation is the 
"Procedure to Reduce Workmen's Compensation Litigation," 
issued by the WCAB in October of 1967. Basically, the 
procedures are an attempt to avoid the filing of applications 
before the case is ready for decision. It had been found 
that, in many cases, applications were filed when injured 
employees first visited an attorney even though they were 
receiving all benefits to which they were entitled and were 
not yet ready for permanent disability rating. The basic tool 
6. Statistics taken from a speech de-
livered by Morton R. Colvin, Chairman, 
WCAB, September 16, 1968, to the 
8 
International Association of Industrial 
Accident Boards and Commissions. 
CAL LAW 1969 113 
15
Goshkin: Workmen's Compensation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
Workmen's Compensation 
of the procedure to reduce litigation is a form which injured 
employees' attorneys send to insurance companies or self-
insured employers requesting information and stipulations. 
Whether the reduction in litigation is due to the procedures 
to reduce litigation or to the more prompt payment of first 
disability benefits is still questionable. When an injured 
employee is promptly put on temporary disability and receives 
his first temporary disability check within two weeks, he is 
far less likely to consult an attorney. When the employer 
or carrier is dilatory in instituting temporary disability bene-
fits, the injured employee wants his status determined and 
seeks legal counsel or files an application for a hearing on 
his own behalf. Therefore, it is probable that the reduction 
of filings is more closely related to the great increase in prompt 
payment of first benefits than it is to the procedures to reduce 
litigation. 
Regardless of the reason, the filing of original applications 
for hearing is markedly reduced for the first time in many 
years. Whether that reduction will mean an actual reduc-
tion of litigated cases remains to be seen. Perhaps the effect 
of the procedures instituted by the WCAB will be merely to 
delay the filing of applications. It will probably take a year 
or two to determine whether workmen's compensation litiga-
tion in California has actually been reduced. 
Apportionment of Liability 
Basically, there are only two types of apportionment in 
workmen's compensation law: (1) the apportioning of li-
ability for a single disability between multiple employers or 
insurance carriers where the employee's disability is due to a 
continuous injury or occupational disease; and (2) the appor-
tioning of liability for an employee's disability between mul-
tiple causes. Significant developments have appeared in both 
areas of the law of apportionment during the past year. 
Apportionment for Multiple Causes 
The question whether an employer's liability for temporary 
disability and medical treatment could be apportioned between 
114 CAL LAW 1969 
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an industrial injury and a pre-existing non-industrial condition 
had not been squarely decided by the courts before this year. 
The WCAB had simply taken the position that such apportion-
ment was not required by section 4663. 7 Those cases which 
had attacked the WCAB interpretationS were decided on other 
grounds. In Granado v. WCAB 9 the supreme court an-
nounced that there may be no apportionment of the liability 
for temporary disability payments or medical treatment be-
tween industrial injuries and non-industrial injuries. While 
the couJt, discussed only apportionment between industrial 
injuries and non-industrial injuries, its reasoning suggests that 
apportionment will not be permitted between industrial in-
juries and any pre-existing non-industrial condition, regardless 
of the cause of the pre-existing medical problem. 
Granado did not work any change in the law as understood 
by most practitioners in the field. Prior to Granado the 
WCAB had consistently taken the position that, while it 
could apportion temporary disability and medical treatment, 
it was not required to do so by the statute and that it did 
not make such apportionment as a matter of policy. Attacks 
on the WCAB's refusal to apportion temporary disability 
and medical treatment had always failed. Therefore, there 
was a general acceptance of the rule that temporary disability 
and medical treatment would not be apportioned. What 
Granado did was to remove a nagging doubt and to change 
an administrative policy into a rule of law. 
The rules for apportioning permanent disability between 
the effects of an industrial injury and a pre-existing condition 
were reviewed and redefined twice by the supreme court dur-
ing the past year .10 In both decisions the court disagreed 
7. Cal. Lab. Code § 4663. In case 
of aggravation of any disease existing 
prior to a compensable injury, compen-
sation shall be allowed only for the 
proportion of the disability due to the 
aggravation of such prior disease which 
is reasonably attributed to the injury. 
8. Fred Gledhill Chevrolet v. Indus-
trial Accident Comm., 62 Cal.2d 59, 
41 Cal. Rptr. 170,396 P.2d 586 (1964); 
American Can Co. v. Industrial Acci-
dent Comm., 196 Cal. App.2d 445, 16 
Cal. Rptr. 424 (1961). 
9. 69 Cal.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 678, 
445 P.2d 294 (1968). 
10. Zemke v. WCAB, 68 Cal.2d 794, 
69 Cal. Rptr. 88, 441 P.2d 928 (1968); 
Berry v. WCAB, 68 Cal.2d 786, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 68, 441 P.2d 908 (1968). 
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with the WCAB's interpretation of the medical evidence and 
held that the board's awards were not supported by substan-
tial evidence. The two cases did not state any new prin-
ciples of law, but they are interesting only as an indication 
of the court's resolve to deny apportionment unless the medical 
evidence supporting it is stated in a set formula. 
Subsequent to these decisions, the court of appeal faced 
the same questionll and concluded: 
. . . [W]hile the employer is liable for that portion 
of the total disability caused by the industrial injury, 
he is not liable for the part of the disability which". . . 
would have resulted, in the absence of the industrial 
injury, from the 'normal progress' of the pre-existing 
disease. "12 
It would seem that unless the medical opinions use the 
terminology "x percent of the employee's present disability 
would have resulted in the absence of the industrial injury 
from the normal progress of the pre-existing disease," the 
courts do not find apportionment permissible.13 
Apportionment for Continuous Trauma Injuries 
In the nine years since Beveridge v. Industrial Accident 
Commission,14 continuous trauma cases have burgeoned to 
a point where they deserve a classification of their own. 
Probably the major development in continuous trauma cases 
in the past year was the complete confusion caused by three 
11. Peterson v. WCAB, 266 Cal. App. 
2d -, 72 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968). 
12. 266 Cal. App.2d at -, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. at 548. 
13. In Fine v. WCAB, 32 C.C.c. 492 
(1967), (opinion not published in offi-
cial reports) which was decided by the 
court of appeal prior to the two supreme 
court cases mentioned, the court was 
content with medical testimony that 
"The bulk of his (employee's) problem 
predated the injury," and that the in-
116 CAL LAW 1969 
dustrial injury contributed to the dis-
ability only to a "minimal extent." 
However, it annulled the appeals board's 
decision denying the applicant benefits 
and returned the matter, ordering the 
board to determine how much is "mini-
mal," though it is a well established and 
well-known rule that minimal disabili-
ties are not ratable. 
14. 175 Cal. App.2d 592, 246 P.2d 
545 (1959). 
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appellate decisions: Dow Chemical Company v. WCAB/ 5 
De Luna v. WCAB/6 and Miller v. WCAB.17 In these cases 
the courts apparently attempted to restructure the law of 
continuous trauma, and in doing so, set forth decisions with 
effects so troublesome that eventual amendments and addi-
tions to the Labor Code were enacted to offset them.Is 
The Dow case concerned itself with whether the WCAB 
was bound by its final decisions granting permanent dis-
ability ratings for two specific injuries when considering the 
same employee's claim for disability for a period of continuous 
trauma which encompassed the dates of specific injuries. The 
same workmen's compensation insurance carriers were defend-
ants in the continuous trauma case as had been held liable 
for the specific incidents. The WCAB found that the em-
ployee's total permanent disability at the end of the period 
of continuous trauma was 75 percent and that he was due a 
life pension. The WCAB granted credit to the carriers who 
had been held liable for the specific injuries in the amount 
of their liability for those injuries. But the supreme court 
held that the action of the WCAB was improper since ". . . 
any injury which produced by itself a definable disability 
should not be submerged in a series of injuries with indemnity 
being awarded for repetitive trauma."19 The court pointed 
out that the constructive date of the continuous trauma injury 
was the time when it finally resulted in disability (at the end 
of the period) and, as the two specific injuries had occurred 
prior to that date, section 4750 of the Labor Code would 
preclude the board from lumping the disabilities awarded in 
the specific incidents with the total disability. 
The employee in Dow had also petitioned for subsequent 
injuries fund benefits but that claim had been denied by the 
board. The supreme court reversed the board and adopted 
the rule, for the purpose of the subsequent injuries statutes, 
15. 67 Cal.2d 483, 62 Cal. Rptr. 757, 18. Assembly Daily Journal, Sept. 10, 
432 P.2d 365 (1967). 1968, pp. 21 and 22. 
16. 258 Cal. App.2d 199, 65 Cal. 19. 67 Ca1.2d at 492, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. 421 (1968). at 763, 432 P.2d at 371. 
17. 258 Cal. App.2d 490, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 835 (1968). 
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that a cumulative injury will be deemed to have been incurred 
on ". . the last day of the period in which the WCAB 
finds that cumulative injury was received by repetitive expo-
sure to stress or other cause; or, if disability does not appear 
until yet a later date, the time when the employee becomes 
disabled."20 The court pointed out that adopting that date 
would make the two specific injuries prior in time and provide 
a basis for holding the subsequent injuries fund liable for 
benefits. 
De Luna was decided by the court of appeal some three 
months after Dow. De Luna filed a claim on November 2, 
1966, alleging a specific incident of injury occurring on July 
16, 1962. He also filed a separate claim alleging continuous 
trauma from July, 1960 and thereafter. The WCAB found 
the claim of specific injury barred by the statute of limitations 
but granted benefits for the continuous trauma injury. The 
court of appeal ruled that the board had erred in holding 
the claim for specific injury barred by the statute of limita-
tions, reasoning that the incident of specific injury ". 
should have been considered as an integral part of the appli-
cant's claim for cumulative injuries."l In arriving at its 
decision the court stated, without citation of authority: 
"While the applicant may file both a claim of specific 
injury and a claim of cumulative injury covering the 
same period of time, he may not have an award on both 
nor is disability, either temporary or permanent, to be 
apportioned between the two claims."2 
The De Luna decision would seem to be specifically con-
trary to Dow, yet the supreme court refused hearing. 
In Miller the WCAB again found an incident of specific 
injury barred by the statute of limitations, but allowed recovery 
on a claim for continuous trauma. Again the court disagreed 
with the board's finding and annulled the decision on the 
20. 67 Cal.2d at 493, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2. 258 Cal. App.2d at 202, 65 Cal. 
at 764, 432 P.2d at 372. Rptr. at 423. 
1. 258 Cal. App.2d at 204, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. at 425. 
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ground that the board should have considered the specific 
incident alleged ". as the first of many exacerbations 
causing the cumulative injury, and should have taken that 
injury into consideration in determining whether the applicant 
sustained a cumulative injury which had its inception on that 
date."3 Again, though Miller is seemingly contrary to Dow, 
the supreme court denied hearing. 
The WCAB, as well as most practitioners in the field of 
workmen's compensation, were completely confused by the 
Dow, De Luna, and Miller cases. In an attempt to set forth 
its understanding of those cases, the board wrote a twenty-
page en bane opinion in Burris v. Southern California Rapid 
Transit Distriet,4 wherein it reviewed and set forth the many 
procedural problems raised by the three troublesome cases 
and made a statement of its understanding of the procedures 
now required of the WCAB in the light of the holdings of 
these cases. Even though legislation subsequent to the cases 
may have solved some of the problems, the author strongly 
recommends that anyone interested in continuous trauma cases 
read and reread the Burris decision. What action, if any, the 
appellate courts will take on Burris is not known at the time 
of this writing. 
In an attempt to offset the problems raised by the Dow, 
De Luna, and Miller decisions, the legislature, in the First 
Extraordinary session, enacted Assembly Bill 1 which became 
effective January 1, 1969. This bill added section 3208.1 
to the Labor Code to provide that an injury, for the purposes 
of workmen's compensation law, may be "specific" or "cumu-
lative" as defined therein and that the date of cumulative in-
jury "shall be the date of disability caused thereby." The 
bill also added section 3208.2 to the Labor Code to provide 
that when disability, need for medical treatment, or death 
results from the combined effects of two or more injuries, 
either specific or cumulative or both, all questions of fact 
and law shall be separately determined with respect to each 
injury. This section of the code specifically provides for 
3. 258 Cal. App.2d at 496-497, 65 
Cal. Rptr. at 838. 
4. 33 C.C.C. 419 (1968). 
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apportionment between such injuries. An amendment to sec-
tion 5305 added the provision that no one injury, whether 
specific or cumulative, shall for any purpose merge into or 
form a part of another injury. 
Whether these amendments and additions will clarify cumu-
lative injury proceedings and awards, or add to the confusion, 
remains to be seen. The WCAB is adopting the policy that 
the additions and amendments to the Labor Code just dis-
cussed are substantive in nature and therefore will not have 
any effect in causes of action arising before the January 1, 
1969 effective date. 5 
Does a specific incident of injury occurring before January 
1, 1969, merge with a continuous trauma resulting in disability 
after that date? The question remains unanswered pending 
judicial interpretation of the new sections and amendment. 
In Fruehauf Corp. v. WCAR 6 the supreme court decided 
that the date of injury in continuous trauma cases should 
be that set forth in section 5412, which had previously been 
held to apply only to occupational disease cases rather than 
the date set forth in section 5411, which states that it is to 
be applicable "except in cases of occupational disease." The 
importance of this determination is that it affects the running 
of the statute of limitations, which does not begin to run until 
the "date of injury." 
Section 5411, which had been held applicable to all injuries 
other than occupational disease injuries and which had pre-
viously bee-n the section used to determine the date of injury 
in cumulative trauma cases, in effect holds that the date of 
injury is the date of last exposure. Section 5412, which 
previously had been applicable only to occupational disease 
cases, provides that the date of injury is the date upon which 
the employee first suffered disability from the disease, "and 
either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
5. Memorandum to all referees and 6. 68 Cal.2d 569, 68 Cal. Rptr. 164, 
attorneys, dated September 30, 1968, 440 P.2d 236 (1968). 
from Morton R. Colvin, Chairman, 
WCAB and its attached statement of 
policy. 
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have known, that said disability was caused by his present or 
prior employment." Many occupational disease cases have 
been brought years after last exposure and disability under 
the theory that the injured employee did not know, and with 
the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have known, 
that his disability was work-connected. 
The WCAB has frequently applied the "occupational dis-
ease" rule to what would appear to be continuous trauma 
injuries by the simple expedient of finding that the injured 
employee suffered from an "occupational disease."7 
The court's change in date of injury in continuous trauma 
cases, as affected by Fruehauf, may apply only to causes of 
action accruing prior to January 1, 1969. The new section 
3208.1, which was effective on that date, specifically provides 
that the date of injury in continuous trauma cases ". 
shall be the date of disability caused thereby." (Caveat-the 
courts have yet to interpret that provision.) 
Earnings 
In recent years, the question of whether fringe benefits 
should be included in calculating an employee's average earn-
ings has been litigated more and more often. In Norton v. 
North American Aviation, Inc. s the WCAB decided that those 
fringe benefits which are continued during an injured em-
ployee's period of disability should not be included in deter-
mining average weekly earnings for the purpose of calculating 
an injured employee's weekly temporary disability rate. AB 
1, effective January 1, 1969, which amended section 4454, 
further clarified the question of what is to be included in 
"earnings" by adding the following phrase: 
. . . [N]or shall there be included either the cost or 
the market value of any savings, wage continuation, wage 
replacement, or stock acquisition program or of any 
employee benefit programs for which the employer pays 
7. See, for example, Aerojet-General 
Corp. v. WCAB, 32 c.e.c. 398 (1967). 
8. 32 c.c.c. 498 (1967). 
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or contributes to persons other than the employee or 
his family. 
This phrase would seem to excluded those fringe benefits 
paid to union welfare funds and insurance companies from 
earnings. As benefits paid directly to an employee or his 
family have always been considered properly included in the 
average weekly earnings, it seems that now the old question 
of fringe benefits will no longer be troublesome. 
Employee-Employer Relationship 
Baby sitters have been excluded from the benefits of work-
men's compensation by statutory amendment. Labor Code 
section 3352(f), which excludes those persons engaged in 
household domestic service except where employed by one 
employer for over 52 hours per week, has been amended 
to include those persons engaged in part-time care and super-
vision of children in a private residence. A baby sitter not 
employed for more than 52 hours a week by the same employer 
will not be able to claim workmen's compensation benefits 
after January 1, 1969. Whether a baby sitter working less 
than 52 hours a week could have claimed compensation bene-
fits before this amendment is questionable. The status of 
baby sitters has not been directly decided by the courts and 
there has been much speculation that they might be excluded 
under section 3352(f) even without the amendment. 
Injury Arising out of and in the Course of Employment 
Death by Suicide 
Prior to 1960, death benefits were not allowed to widows 
of employees who died by their own hands. While the Labor 
Code made no mention of suicide as such, section 3600 (e) 
provided (and still provides) that an injury is compensable 
"where the injury is not intentionally self-inflicted." (Em-
phasis added.) Before 1960, the WCAB and courts held 
that the quoted section precluded the granting of death ben-
efits where the injured employee died by his own hand, even 
if the suicide was the proximate result of an industrial injury. 
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The WCAB did recognize, however, the possibility that a 
suicide might be compensable. Alexander v. California De-
partment of Insurance,9 decided in 1948, denied death benefits, 
but stated that such benefits could be allowed where the 
industrial injury resulted in an insanity". such as to 
cause the employee to take his own life through an unaccount-
able impulse or in a delirium or frenzy, without conscious 
volition. ."10 However, the writer found no recorded 
California case prior to 1960 in which the board actually 
found that the industrial injury caused such an insanity. 
In 1960, the court of appeal changed the test for com-
pensability in Burnight v. Industrial Accident Commission.l1 
The WCAB had found that the employee's nervous break-
down and manic-depressive psychosis arose out of and oc-
curred in the course of his employment but denied death 
benefits because of the testimony of a psychiatrist that the 
deceased's act was voluntary and that he had the mental 
capacity to, and did, realize the consequences of his act. 
The court of appeal, in considering the case and the state of 
the law at that time, stated: "We think that the test is and 
should be, not did the employee know what he was doing, 
but was the compulsion or the impulse to commit suicide 
one which he could not resist.,,12 The court added, by way 
of dicta, that if the industrial injury results in pain that the 
employee believes to be unbearable, or if the employee be-
comes so depressed as a result of his injury that he thinks 
suicide is the only way out, or if the industrial injury results 
in any condition that causes the employee to feel that death 
will afford him his only relief, his act of suicide directly results 
from the industrial injury, and unless it appears that the 
employee could have resisted the impulse to commit suicide, 
his death should be compensable. The court also added that 
if it could be shown by competent expert testimony that 
9. 14 c.c.c. 123 (1948). 
10. 14 C.C.c. at 123. 
11. 181 Cal. App.2d 816, 5 Cal. Rptr. 
786 (1960). 
12. 181 Cal. App.2d at 822, 5 Cal. 
Rptr. at 790. 
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absent the injury there would have been no suicide, the injury 
is the proximate cause of death. 
The legislature acted speedily after Burnight to add another 
sub-section to section 3600 aimed directly at death by sui-
cide. This sub-section provided that where an employee 
wilfully and deliberately caused his own death, it was not 
compensable. I3 The legislature's action seemed to be an 
attempt to limit or overrule Burnight and to reinstate the 
old narrower rule applied by the WCAB for so many years. 
Perhaps because most attorneys believed this was the legis-
lative intent, the new provision did not come before the 
courts for construction until 1968. 
In 1968, in the case of Beauchamp v. WCAB,14 the court 
considered for the first time the compatibility of section 3600 
with the Burnight decision. In Beauchamp the WCAB denied 
death benefits for suicide apparently believing that the addition 
of the new section again reinstated the old rule, precluding 
compensability where the deceased knew what he was doing. 
Not so, said the district court, holding that the legislative 
amendment was entirely consistent with Burnight and that 
the rule stated therein must be followed. 
As the supreme court denied hearing in Beauchamp, it 
appears that where it can be shown by competent evidence 
that but for the industrial injury there would have been no 
suicide, the suicide is compensable. 
Injury in Altercation with Employer 
In Litzmann v. WCAB/5 the court of appeal appears to 
have attempted judicial repeal of the sub-section of Labor 
Code section 3600, which provides that as a condition to the 
right to compensation benefits the injury must not arise out 
of an altercation in which the injured employee is the initial 
physical aggressor. I6 The court, while specifically stating that 
it was not considering the constitutional question, seemed to 
be declaring the provision, section 3600 (g), invalid on the 
13. Cal. Lab. Code § 3600(f). 15. 266 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
14. 259 Cal. App.2d 147, 66 Cal. 731 (1968). 
Rptr. 352 (1968). 16. Cal. Lab. Code § 3600(g). 
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ground that it is unconstitutional. The Litzmann court also 
substitutes its judgment of the inference to be drawn from 
the evidence for the inference drawn by the referee, and does 
so without so much as the courtesy of a nod to sections 5952 
and 5953 of the Code.17 
In Litzmann a truck driver, waiting in a dispatch room with 
other truck drivers, went to a coffee urn to draw some hot 
water. He was apparently bumped by another truck driver 
and turned and threw the cup of hot water at the other man. 
The other driver became irate and picked up a coffee pot 
and emptied its contents on Litzmann. Litzmann was burned 
and applied for workmen's compensation benefits. The ref-
eree found that he was injured in the course and scope of his 
employment, but that his injury arose out of an altercation 
in which he was the initial aggressor and that benefits must 
therefore be denied under section 3600(g). Litzmann's peti-
tion for reconsideration was denied and the court granted his 
petition for review. 
After devoting most if its discussion to a caselS decided 
before the enactment of section 3600(g) the court mentioned 
that in 1961 the legislature enacted a sub-section which pro-
hibits compensation benefits to the initial physical aggressor 
and in a footnote stated that, in view of the earlier case, the 
enactment might be unconstitutional but, as the question was 
not before it, there was no need for the court to decide its 
constitutionality. The court went on to discuss the only case 
in which that amendment has been comidered,19 a case which 
distinguished "altercation" from "horseplay" by characterizing 
"horseplay" as an absence of animosity and "altercation" as 
a willingness to inflict, or the actual infliction of, bodily harm. 
The Litzmann court then concluded, ". . . We are satisfied 
17. Labor Code §§ 5952 and 5953 
are reproduced herein under the head-
ing The Change of Judicial A ttitude ill 
Appellate Re\'iew of WCAB Decisions, 
footnotes 6 and 7. 
18. State Compensation Ins. Fund v. 
Industrial Accident Comm., 38 Cal.2d 
659, 242 P.2d 311 (1952). In this case, 
the supreme court decided that an ap-
plicant was entitled to workmen's com-
pensation benefits irrespective of fault 
and even though he was the aggressor. 
19. Tate v. Industrial Accident 
Comm., 120 Cal. App.2d 657, 261 P.2d 
759 (1953). 
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that the evidence does not sustain the finding that the applicant 
was the aggressor, and that, even if it did, compensation could 
not be denied on that ground."20 (Emphasis added.) 
The court supported its re-evaluation of the facts with the 
statement: 
There is no evidence here that there was any willingness 
or intent to inflict bodily harm on Dean, or that he [Litz-
mann] actually did inflict any bodily harm on him. It 
also seems clear that applicant's act was characterizied 
by an absence of animosity.1 
What made it clear to the court that the act of throwing 
hot water, freshly drawn from a coffee urn, at another man 
was characterized by an "absence of animosity" was left un-
stated and, absent clairvoyance, would appear to require the 
drawing of an inference from the evidence. 
In another district of the court of appeal, the claimant in 
Ochsner v. WCAB 2 attempted to raise the issue of unconstitu-
tionality of section 3600 (g) . Review of the constitutional 
question was denied by the court of appeal and by the supreme 
court. At the time of this writing, it is not known if the 
supreme court will grant a hearing in Litzmann. If a hearing 
is not granted, there is a strong possibility that section 3600 
(g) may be deemed unconstitutional in some judicial districts 
and constitutional in others. 
Insurance Coverage 
In a case of first impression, Pacific Indemnity Co. v. 
WCAB,3 the district court decided that an employer's work-
men's compensation insurance policy provides insurance cov-
erage for the employer's intentional assault upon an employee, 
but that the employee is confined to his workmen's compen-
sation benefits and may not sue his employer for civil damages. 
In an earlier appeal in the same matter, the court disapproved 
20. 266 Cal. App.2d at -, 71 Cal. 2. 33 C.C.C. 387 (1968). 
Rptr. at 736. 3. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
1. 266 Cal. App.2d at -, 71 Cal. 710 (1968). 
Rptr. at 736. 
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a WCAB decision that the workmen's compensation law does 
not cover injuries caused by an assault by the employer, and 
the court granted the injured employee the right to proceed 
before the WCAB (then the Industrial Accident Commission) 
for workmen's compensation benefits.4 Following that earlier 
decision, the superior court granted a defense motion for dis-
missal of the civil damage action which the employee had filed 
against her employer. The employee had been granted com-
pensation benefits and the WCAB had held that the employer's 
workmen's compensation carrier was liable for those benefits. 
The compensation carrier appealed the WCAB decision hold-
ing it liable under the compensation policy, and the employee 
appealed dismissal of her civil action; the appeals were con-
solidated. 
While not questioning the employee's substantive right to 
compensation benefits, the carrier disclaimed insurance cov-
erage on the theory that statutory declarations of public policy 
apart from the compensation law preclude insurance covering 
wilful injury by a policy holder. Specifically, the carrier 
relied on Insurance Code section 533, which states in part, 
"An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act 
of the insured," and on Civil Code section 1668, which states 
in part, "All contracts which have for their objective, directly 
or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his 
own . . . wilful injury to the person or property of another 
are against the policy of the law." 
In considering these contentions, the court pointed out that 
Insurance Code section 11661 specifically prohibits an em-
ployer's insuring against the penalty for serious and wilful 
misconduct and that Labor Code sections 3700 and 3710.2 
make it mandatory upon the employer to "secure the pay-
ment of compensation" either by liability insurance or by a 
certificate of consent to self insure. The court stated that if 
Insurance Code section 533 and Civil Code section 1668 were 
to apply to workmen's compensation liability, this would de-
4. Azevedo v. Industrial Accident 
Comm., 243 Cal. App.2d 370, 52 Cal. 
Rptr. 283 (I966). 
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prive Insurance Code section 11661 of a useful function. The 
latter section is a specialized expression of public policy ex-
pressed by the other two statutes, "but evolved for the partic-
ular purpose of workmen's compensation coverage."5 
Therefore, in the workmen's compensation system, Insur-
ance Code section 11661, prohibiting an employer's insuring 
himself against his liability for the penalty for serious and 
wilful misconduct, serves as a sole spokesman of public policy. 
Section 533 of the Insurance Code and section 1668 of the 
Civil Code are not applicable to compensation insurance 
coverage and do not prohibit insurance against the employer's 
ordinary liability for disability compensation and medical ex-
pense even when such liability is caused by the employer's 
wilful wrong. 
The court pointed out that most of the decisions concerning 
an employee's right to proceed against his employer in the 
superior court or before the WCAB have been decisions on 
procedural matters, not on substantive rights. The court 
found that Labor Code sections 3600 and 3601 are substantive 
declarations confining an employee's claim to workmen's com-
pensation benefits and precluding an employee from the right 
to civil damages. 
On September 15, 1967, the Insurance Commissioner issued 
Ruling No. 157 which deleted Rule IV, paragraph 5 of the 
Manual of Rules, Classifications and Basic Rates for Work-
men's Compensation Insurance. This rule had been in effect 
for many years, permitting workmen's compensation insurance 
carriers to exclude corporate executive officers from work-
men's compensation coverage by special endorsement. The 
effect of this ruling is that workmen's compensation policies 
with an effective date on or after April 1, 1968 may no longer 
exclude corporate executive officers from workmen's compen-
sation coverage. 
Right to Control Medical Treatment 
In Zeeb v. WCAB,6 the supreme court changed what was 
5. Pacific Indemnity v. WCAB, 264 6. 67 Cal.2d 496, 62 Cal. Rptr. 753, 
Cal. App.2d at -,70 Cal. Rptr. at 714. 432 P.2d 361 (1967). 
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generally considered well-established law for the past 40 years. 
Prior to 1928, the Industrial Accident Commission had 
adopted a policy that once an employer or carrier lost control 
of the medical treatment to be provided for an industrial 
injury, it could not be regained without consent of the em-
ployee.7 In 1928, the court of appeal handed down a decision 
which the then Industrial Accident Commission (and most 
authorities) felt required adoption of a policy that "lost 
medical control" could be regained by adequate tender. 8 
In Zeeb, the employee had received treatment from a doctor 
selected by the carrier apparently until his condition became 
quiescent. Several months later, when his condition again 
required treatment, the doctor chosen by the carrier refused 
to render further treatment on the ground that the employee's 
condition at that time was not due to the industrial injury. 
The employee went to a doctor of his choice and later sought, 
and was granted, reimbursement by the WCAB for self-
procured medical treatment. Later the carrier notified the 
employee that it was authorizing further treatment by the 
doctor it had originally selected, and would not authorize 
further treatment by the doctor chosen by the employee. The 
employee refused to accept the services of the carrier's doctor 
and petitioned the WCAB for a determination that he was 
entitled to continue treatment with the doctor he had selected, 
at the expense of the carrier. The WCAB denied the em-
ployee's claim and he appealed. The supreme court stated 
that, because of the ". . vacillating position of the Com-
mission, there does not appear to be any basis in this case 
for the application of the principle that long-standing admin-
istrative interpretation of a statute is entitled to great weight."9 
The court, finding that the 1928 case on which the Industrial 
7. See 2 Hanna, California Law of 
Employee Injuries and Workmen's Com-
pensation (1967) pages 16-35, note 55. 
8. 2 Hanna, California Law of Em-
ployee Injuries and Workmen's Compen-
saliOi/ (1967) pages 16-35, Section 16-
.04(2)(d) and note 55 therein. 
9. The court did not specify in what 
9 
particular it felt the "Commission" was 
guilty of "vacillation", but as the WCAB 
and its predecessor, the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission have both maintained 
the same interpretation of section 4600, 
as regards right of medical control, for 
40 years, the court's standard of con-
stancy might just be a little high. 
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Accident Commission had based its change of interpretation 
of section 4600 had been interpreted too broadly, held that 
where the employer or carrier has refused medical treatment 
necessitating an employee to procure his own treatment, the 
treatment should continue with the doctor chosen by the 
employee, in the absence of a change of condition or evidence 
that the treatment given by the employee's doctor is defective, 
or unless additional treatment is necessary. 
The Zeeb case has not only changed a long-standing and 
well-established rule on workmen's compensation law, but 
has also sown the seeds for much litigation. What change 
of condition is necessary to permit the employer or carrier 
to regain control? What treatment is "defective"? How long 
must the employer or carrier continue paying for treatment 
by a doctor of the injured employee's choice when the employ-
ee's condition doesn't improve? When "additional treatment 
is necessary," must the employer continue to provide the 
employee with treatment by the doctor of his choice, as well 
as obtaining additional specialists of the employer-carrier's 
choice? What is "additional treatment"? These questions 
will provide some interesting cases. 
Payment and Amount of Benefits 
In Grillo v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. 10 the WCAB, 
in an en banc decision, laid down rules for the type of instru-
ment that must be used in paying workmen's compensation 
benefits. The carrier in Grillo used a draft on an out-of-state 
bank to satisfy its liability for benefits awarded an injured 
employee. Local banks to which the employee took the 
draft would not cash it, but accepted it for collection at the 
cost of $1.00. Collection took 11 days. The employee filed 
a petition requesting a penalty for the carrier's delay in pay-
ment as well as for its failure to pay interest. The referee 
found that the payment of compensation had been unreason-
ably delayed and penalized the carrier for failing to comply 
with the provisions of section 4651, which requires that pay-
ment of disability benefits shall not be made by a written instru-
10. 33 C.C.C. 438 (1968). 
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ment ". . . unless it is negotiable and payable in cash, on 
demand, without discount, at some established place of busi-
ness in the state." The referee also found that the carrier 
had not complied with section 5800, which requires the pay-
ment of interest on all due and unpaid payments from the date 
of making and filing of awards. The WCAB granted recon-
sideration on its own motion and upheld the referee's decision. 
The WCAB noted that it was aware of section 212, which 
covers the type of instrument required to be used by employ-
ers in payment of employees' wages, and which requires that 
such an instrument must be "negotiable and payable in cash, 
on demand, without discount, at some established place of 
business in the State, the name and address of which must 
appear on the instrument. ." While recognizing that 
section 4651 does not specifically require that an instrument 
used in payment of workmen's compensation benefits show 
on its face the name and address of some established place 
of business in the state in which it could be cashed, the board 
thought that the requirement of section 4651, that instruments 
used to pay workmen's compensation benefits be payable at 
some established place in the state, would be rendered mean-
ingless unless such place was plainly shown on the face of the 
instrument. 
The board also noted that while the receipt of a properly 
drawn instrument in payment of compensation would toll the 
running of interest, the instrument used in the case before it 
was not properly drawn, and therefore interest should be 
awarded. 
For the first time since 1959, the legislature increased the 
amount of some compensation benefits. Sections 4453 and 
4460 were amended by AB 1, effective January 1, 1969, to 
increase the maximum average weekly earnings to be used in 
computing temporary disability from $107.69 to $134.62. 
The effect of this amendment is to increase maximum tempo-
rary disability from $70.00 per week to $87.50 per week. 
The statutory amendments have no effect on the minimum 
temporary disability rate nor on the permanent disability rate. 
Section 4702 was amended to increase the death benefits 
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of a surviving widow from $17,500 to $20,000 and to increase 
the death benefit of a surviving widow with one or more 
dependent minor children from $20,500 to $23,000. No 
increase was made in the maximum amount payable to partial 
dependents. 
Section 4701 (a) was amended to increase the maximum 
allowable for burial expense from $600 to $1,000. 
Subrogation 
Harrison v. Englebrick ll laid to rest the troublesome prob-
lem of the applicable statute of limitations for intervention in 
. negligence suits against third parties. This problem had not 
existed until 1964 when the court in Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Fabian12 mentioned, by way of dicta, that the employer 
had only one year to file a lien or to intervene. It was generally 
thought that the court's dicta would not cause a serious prob-
lem because of section 3853's clear statement providing for 
the employee's or the employer's right to intervene in the 
other's suit. "If the action is brought by either the employer 
or the employee, the other may, at any time before trial on 
the facts, join as a party plaintiff or shall consolidate his action, 
if brought independently." (Emphasis added.) Section 3856 
(b), on which the employer's right to a lien against a recovery 
by an employee is based, does not specifically indicate the 
time an application for a lien against a judgment must be filed, 
but similar language in earlier forms of that section has been 
held to grant the employer the right to file the lien at any 
time before satisfaction of judgment. 13 
In Harrison, the injured employee filed a timely suit for 
damages against a third party on April 3, 1962, and the 
employer's workmen's compensation carrier intervened on 
October 13, 1964. The defendants in the civil suit demurred 
to the complaint in intervention on the ground that the cause 
of action therein contained was barred by the statute of limi-
11. 254 Cal. App.2d 871, 62 Cal. 13. Jacobsen v. Industrial Accident 
Rptr. 831 (1967). Comm., 212 Cal. 440, 299 P. 66 (1931); 
12. 228 Cal. App.2d 427, 436, 39 Chase v. Southern Pacific Co., 6 Cal. 
Cal. Rptr. 570, 576 (1964). App.2d 273, 43 P.2d 1108 (1935). 
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tations. The superior court sustained the demurrer of the 
defendants without leave to amend and entered a judgment 
dismissing the employer's complaint in intervention. The 
employer appealed and the court of appeal discussed old 
cases permitting the employee to intervene in an employer's 
suit well after the one-year period had run and decided the 
employer should have the same right. Nowhere in its deci-
sion does the court refer to the plain language of section 
3853 which grants either the employer or the employee the 
right to intervene in the other's suit "at any time before trial 
on the facts." 
The WCAB, sitting en bane, decided Pearce v. Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Co./4 concerning an employer's right to 
credit against future compensation liability for an employee's 
third-party recovery. The full impact of Pearce has not yet 
been felt. In the Pearce case, heirs of an employee killed 
in the course of his employment filed suit against a third 
party. That suit was settled. After settlement of the third-
party suit, the workmen's compensation carrier ceased pay-
ment of the workmen's compensation death benefits awarded 
certain of the heirs on the theory that its credit for the third-
party recovery offset its liability. The heirs petitioned the 
WCAB to enforce payment under the award alleging, among 
other contentions, that the employer's negligence contributed 
to the employee's fatal injury and that credit for third-party 
recovery should be denied. The issue of whether the WCAB 
has jurisdiction to find negligence on the part of the employer, 
and to disallow credit based on such finding, was submitted 
to the trial referee by brief without a hearing respecting the 
employer's negligence. The referee issued a supplemental 
award finding that, if the employer's negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of the employee's fatal injury, the carrier would 
be barred from claiming credit for the third-party recovery. 
The referee further decided that the WCAB had jurisdiction 
to decide the issue of credit and that the decision of that issue 
necessarily included a decision of whether the employer was 
concurrently negligent. Reconsideration was granted. Some 
14. 33 C.C.C. 243 (1968). 
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of the statements made by the board in its discussion of its 
reasoning are as significant as the actual holding of the case. 
That portion of the holding in which we are here concerned is: 
Accordingly we hold that absent an express waiver of 
credit, the carrier's right to credit under Labor Code Sec-
tion 3862 in the amount of the employee's net recovery 
from the settlement of a third-party suit is absolute and 
unaffected by the employer's alleged negligence.l5 
The board's holding may not be startling, but its discussion 
and reasoning contain several interesting comments. In dis-
cussing section 3861, the section that provides for an employ-
er's right to credit, the board states: "On its face the section 
does not condition the employer's right to credit upon his 
being free from negligence or fault contributing to the em-
ployee's injuries,"l6 and at another place in the decision: 
. . . [I]t may be true that when faced with a Superior 
Court finding of an employer's negligence, and a specific 
indication of the extent of the reduction of the third-
party's judgment, this Board has the power and the duty 
to adjust the employer's or carrier's credit accordingly.l7 
(Emphasis added.) 
It seems that the board is not all convinced that it must 
deny credit to an employer or carrier where there has been a 
superior court finding of the employer's contributory negli-
gence, and it would also appear that the board is at least con-
sidering that section 3861 may give the employer or carrier 
an absolute right to credit against future liability for work-
men's compensation even though the employer's lien for bene-
fits already paid may have been denied in the superior court 
on the ground that the employer was contributorily negli-
gent. 
15. 33 C.C.C. at 249. (The reference 
to section 3862 must be a typographical 
error as that section has nothing to do 
with credit rights. Section 3861, pre-
viously referred to in the opinion, pro-
vides for an employer's right to credit, 
134 CAL LAW 1969 
and thus it must be the section the board 
intended to cite.) 
16. 33 C.C.c. at 246. 
17. 33 C.C.c. at 248. 
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The board makes another intriguing observation: 
An employer's obligation to furnish medical treatment 
may require different considerations respecting a claim of 
credit for a third-party recovery . . . Without deciding 
the issue, it should be noted that the employer's obligation 
to provide medical treatment under Labor Code section 
4600 may not be relieved by applicant's net third-party's 
recovery, since under the subrogation statutes such a 
recovery may relieve only the obligation to pay indem-
nity.Is 
To date, where credit has been granted, it has been granted 
against all future liability including the liability to furnish 
medical treatment. 
Very probably, the board's speculations will soon bring 
before it the question of whether a superior court's finding 
of employer contributory negligence bars credit in the amount 
of the employee's net third-party recovery against future com-
pensation liability and also whether credit, when granted, 
includes the liability for further medical treatment. 
The board also decided in Pearce that it did not have 
jurisdiction to determine whether or not the employer was 
contributorily negligent in causing the employee's injury. 
The old adage "last but not least" applies to the final case 
to be discussed in this article. In LaBorde v. McKesson & 
RobbinsI9 a compensation carrier who had intervened in an 
injured employee's third-party action was appealing from the 
trial court's denial of its lien against the settlement reached 
between the plaintiff-employee and the defendant-third party, 
which purported to cover only the plaintiff's general damages 
and to leave the defendant's liability for special damages open. 
The defendant had raised the issue of the employer's con-
tributory negligence in its answer and, after more than two 
days of trial, the attorneys for the plaintiff-employee and 
third-party defendant informed the court that they had reached 
an agreement to settle the plaintiff's claim for general dam-
18. 33 C.C.c. at 248. 19. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
726 (1968). 
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ages but had given no consideration to the compensation 
carrier's expenditures. The carrier refused to consent to the 
settlement on that basis but made various motions aimed 
at recov~ ring its expenditures from the settlement of the plain-
tiff's "geaeral damages." The trial court denied the motions 
and directed the carrier to proceed to trial on the sole remain-
ing issue, the employer's concurrent negligence. The carrier 
refused, moved instead for dismissal of its complaint in inter-
vention, and made further motions in attempting to impose 
a lien on defendant's recovery, seeking an order allocating 
expenses and fees, attempting to force production of the settle-
ment agreement, restraining the defendant from transferring 
funds to the plaintiff, and restraining the plaintiff from dis-
sipating funds. Appeal followed denial of the carrier's mo-
tions. 
The court of appeal was faced with three problems in sup-
porting the trial court's actions: Section 3859, section 3860, 
and the case of Smith v. Trapp.2o 
The year before the LaBorde decision, another court of 
appeal, in Smith v. Trapp, facing a very similar set of facts, 
held that a plaintiff and defendant in a third-party suit may 
not compromise absent the. employer's consent, though the 
compromise purports to preserve the employer's or carrier's 
rights against the defendant. The court in LaBorde handled 
the Smith case by in part distinguishing it and in part dis-
agreeing with it. The LaBorde court distinguished the Smith 
case by pointing out that there was substantial evidence of 
concurrent negligence on the part of the employer during 
the more than two days of trial on LaBorde where there had 
been no presentation of evidence in the Smith case. The 
LaBorde court further distinguished Smith by pointing out that 
Smith was a wrongful death action in which damages would 
generally be gauged by dependency as were the compensation 
benefits in that case, so that the settlement portions to which 
the plaintiffs and intervening employer were entitled were 
20. 249 Cal. App.2d 929, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 229 (1967). 
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interwoven and overlapping. The LaBorde court also said 
that there were statements in the Smith decision with which 
it could not agree (without specifying them) and, in any 
event, it was not bound by Smith. 
The court was also faced with sections 3859 and 3860 
of the Labor Code which are quite specific in their terms. 
Section 3859 states in part, ". . . No release or settlement 
of any claim under this chapter as to either the employee 
or the employer is valid without the written consent of both." 
Section 3860(a) states in part, that no "settlement . 
with or without suit, is valid or binding as to any party 
thereto without notice to . . . the employer . . . with 
opportunity to the employer to recover the amount of com-
pensation he has paid." Section 3860(b) stales in part, "The 
entire amount of such settlement, with or without suit, is 
subject to the employer's full claim for reimbursement. . . ." 
The LaBorde court admits that sections 3859 and 3860 
would justify the conclusion that a settlement by an employee 
without the consent of the employer or without reimbursing 
the employer in full could not be made. However, the court 
points out that those sections were enacted before decision 
in Witt v. Jackson l and holds that those sections were not 
designed to cover the Witt v. Jackson situation. The court 
states that those sections 
[W]ere not intended to block a settlement be-
tween an injured employee and a third party tortfeasor 
where the concurrent negligence of the employer has 
been made an issue in the litigation and where the settle-
ment is carefully drawn to leave intact all the rights 
of the employer (and his compensation carrier). 2 
The propriety of plaintiff and defendant settling without 
the employer's consent under sections 3859 and 3860 came 
under consideration by Judge Gerald S. Levin of the Superior 
Court of the City and County of San Francisco when he 
granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting such a settlement 
1. 57 Cal.2d 57, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 2. 264 Cal. App.2d at -, 70 Cal. 
366 P.2d 641 (1961). Rptr. at 728. 
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in May of 1965.3 Judge Levin's reasoning and conclusions 
were surprisingly similar to those of the court in Smith. Both 
the Smith court and Judge Levin were presented with the 
arguments that Witt v. Jackson made the provisions of sections 
3859 and 3860 inapplicable and both rejected those argu-
ments. The court in Smith and Judge Levin were both pre-
sented with the argument that permitting a settlement leaving 
the intervening carrier's right to proceed with the case open 
in no way prejudiced the employer or carrier. Both rejected 
this argument, pointing out that an intervenor's status in the 
preparation and trial of a case is one of subordination to 
and in recognition of the propriety of the plaintiff's case and 
that the plaintiff must be permitted to dominate and control 
such a suit to its conclusion, unfettered by the views of the 
intervenors. The court in Smith recognized as well the pos-
sibility of collusion between the parties to the settlement when 
judicial sanction is afforded compromises without the consent 
of the employer. 
The courts that have considered the question of the effect 
of Witt v. Jackson on sections 3859 and 3860 have presented 
us with a mixed bag of views. The only certainty as to the 
question of whether a plaintiff-employee and third-party 
defendant can settle their differences without consideration of 
the intervening employer's lien is that it is uncertain, as are 
many other areas of workmen's compensation law at the 
present time. 
3. Titus v. Haas & Haynie (No. 4th, 1965, issues of the San Francisco 
523156). Reported in the June 3rd and Recorder. 
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